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Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse

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  • Georgy Egorov

    ()

  • Sergei Guriev

    ()

  • Konstantin Sonin

    ()

Abstract

How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler’s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 06-10.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:06-10

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