Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Pillage and property

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jordan, J.S.
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4GV9SS2-1/2/8158fb4056db11edd53027d0fa413cc3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 131 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 (November)
    Pages: 26-44

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:26-44

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
    2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
    4. Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
    5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    6. Usher, Dan, 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-44, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Beardon, Alan F. & Rowat, Colin, 2013. "Efficient sets are small," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 367-374.
    3. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Spatial pillage game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 701-707, December.
    4. Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2011. "A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 461-466, August.
    5. Timo Hiller, 2012. "Friends and Enemies: A Model of Signed Network Formation," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/629, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Matthew O. Jackson & Stephen Nei, 2014. "Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade," Working Papers 2014.46, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2009. "A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core," Staff General Research Papers 13051, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    9. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2012. "Markets and jungles," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 103-141, June.
    10. J. Jordan, 2009. "Power and efficiency in production pillage games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 171-193, September.
    11. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2007. "A Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth," JEPS Working Papers 07-004, JEPS.
    12. Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2013. "Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 13-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:26-44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.