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A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games

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  • Jeffrey Banks
  • John Duggan

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Abstract

We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 285-304

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:285-304

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References

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  1. John Duggan & Mark Fey, . "Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," Wallis Working Papers WP19, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  2. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2006. "Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 194-234, January.
  4. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2001. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a one-Dimensional Model of Bargaining," Wallis Working Papers WP23, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  5. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Haomiao Yu, 2012. "Point-Rationalizability in Large Games," Working Papers 030, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  2. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Communication and Bargaining in the Spatial Model," Papers 09-20-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  3. B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
  5. Hugh-Jones, David, 2010. "Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 25, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  6. repec:cge:warwcg:25 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
  10. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  11. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2010. "Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies," Working Papers 1011, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.
  12. Pech, Gerald, 2012. "Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 14-22.
  13. Jean Guillaume Forand & John Duggan, 2013. "Markovian Elections," Working Papers 1305, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2013.

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