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Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making

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  • George Tridimas

    (University of Ulster)

Abstract

Contrary to modern representative democracies where elections tend to take place years apart, in the direct democracy of ancient Athens the assembly of the citizens met to decide policy up to forty times per year. The paper explores a model of constitutional choice where self-interested citizens decide how long to wait until they vote by maximising the net gain from an uncertain voting outcome. It is found that the frequency of voting increases unambiguously when the probability of being a member of the winning majority increases, and decreases with the loss from being a member of the losing minority and the resource cost of the vote. Under some plausible conditions, the frequency also rises with increases in the utility gain from the vote, the discount rate, and the required majority to pass a policy motion. It is argued that those conditions were met in Athens.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tridimas, 2017. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 209-230, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:28:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9241-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-017-9241-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Miroiu & Catalin Partenie, 2019. "Collective choice in Aristotle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 261-281, September.
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    3. Federica Carugati & Josiah Ober & Barry R. Weingast, 2019. "Is development uniquely modern? Ancient Athens on the doorstep," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 29-47, October.
    4. Thomas L. Hogan, 2022. "The calculus of dissent: Bias and diversity in FOMC projections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 105-135, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting frequency; Direct democracy; Ancient Athens; Constitutional choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • N93 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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