From plurality rule to proportional representation
AbstractI consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are oÂ¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two diÂ¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of oÂ¢ ce: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of oÂ¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Selim Ergun, 2008. "From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation," ThE Papers 08/07, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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