A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team
AbstractWe propose a simple non-cooperative game model in which two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that, depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes: the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, the Laakso–Taagepera index, the best-shot index and the weakest-link index.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 116 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Contest success function; Fragmentation; Herfindahl–Hirschman index; Laakso–Taagepera index; Best-shot index; Weakest-link index;
Other versions of this item:
- Benoît Le Maux & Yvon Rocaboy, 2011. "A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2011-02-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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