It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)
AbstractThis article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Political Studies Association in its journal Political Studies.
Volume (Year): 53 (2005)
Issue (Month): (03)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0032-3217
Other versions of this item:
- Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)," Economics Working Papers 812, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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