From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation
AbstractI consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of o¢ ce: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 08/07.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 23 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Electoral systems; Plurality; Proportional Representation; Coalitions.;
Other versions of this item:
- Selim Ergun, 2010. "From plurality rule to proportional representation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 373-408, November.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-04 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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