Francesco De Sinopoli () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics) Giovanna Iannantuoni () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)
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n this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.
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Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number
31.
Length: 26 Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:31
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988.
"A Theory of Voting Equilibria,"
Discussion Papers
782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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