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Competing for Endorsements

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Author Info
Gene M. Grossman
Elhanan Helpman

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Abstract

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. The authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 501-524
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:3:p:501-524

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

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  2. Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Campos, Nauro F. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2008. "Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes," IZA Discussion Papers 3693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Laussel, Didier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2007. "Should We Really Expect More from Our Friends?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Felix J. J. Vardy & John Morgan, 2007. "On the Buyability of Voting Bodies," IMF Working Papers 07/165, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. James Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Political pressure deflection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 129-150, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Otto Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Do elections lead to informed public decisions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 435-460, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2003. "Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Paper Archive 497, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Valentino Larcinese, 2002. "Rational ignorance and the public choice of redistribution," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 443, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2006. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 169-187, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003. "The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information," CORE Discussion Papers 2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  14. IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 1999. "Divided government and dominance solvability," CORE Discussion Papers 1999065, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  15. Brian G. Knight & Chun-Fang Chiang, 2008. "Media Bias and Influence: Evidence from Newspaper Endorsements," NBER Working Papers 14445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Seth Binder & Eric Neumayer, 2003. "Environmental Pressure Group Strength and Air Pollution: An Empirical Analysis," Others 0312003, EconWPA, revised 25 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
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