Personal Details
First Name: Francesco
Middle Name:
Last Name: De Sinopoli
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pde261
Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage:
Postal Address:
Phone:
Affiliation
(in no particular order)
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (Department of Economic Sciences)
Facoltà di Economia (Faculty of Economics)
Università degli Studi di Verona
Location: Verona, Italy
Homepage: http://www.dse.univr.it/
Email:
Phone: +390458028097
Fax: +390458028486
Postal: Via dell'Università, 4 - I-37129 Verona
Handle: RePEc:edi:isverit (registered authors at this institution)
Works
| Working papers | Articles | Access
and download statistics | Citations (if
any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML
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Working papers
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2009.
"On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems,"
Working Papers
160, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2009.
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009.
"Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria,"
Discussion Papers
2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco De Sionopoli & Carlos Gonzalez Pimienta, 2007.
"Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games,"
Economics Working Papers
we073117, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"Electing a parliament,"
Economics Working Papers
we073319, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008.
"Electing a Parliament,"
Working Papers
150, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case,"
Economics Working Papers
we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly,"
Economics Working Papers
we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2004.
"Meetings With Costly Participation: A Comment,"
Economics Working Papers
we040502, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003.
"A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy,"
CEIS Research Paper
21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003.
"A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria,"
CEIS Research Paper
31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002.
"On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly,"
Economics Working Papers
we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Published as: - Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002.
"Some Results On Strategic Voting And Proportional Representation With Multidimensional Policy Space,"
Economics Working Papers
we025721, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2001.
"Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999.
"Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999.
"A remark on votersÕ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999.
"Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998.
"Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998.
"Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Articles
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009.
"Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: - Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008.
"Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case,"
Economics Working Papers
we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005.
"Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna & ,, 2000.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003.
"A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria,"
CEIS Research Paper
31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
[Downloadable!]
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 29-40, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006.
"Approval voting: three examples,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"Meetings with Costly Participation: Comment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1349-1350, September.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004.
"A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: - De Sinopoli, Francesco & Turrini, Alessandro, 2002.
" A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 163-70.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001.
"On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000.
"Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
NEP Fields
10 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
- NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (6) 2003-03-03 2003-03-03 2005-05-07 2005-05-23 2005-07-03 2007-05-19 Author is listed
- NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (3) 2005-05-07 2005-05-23 2005-05-23 Author is listed
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2005-05-07 2007-06-02 2009-07-03 Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2003-03-03
- NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2009-07-03
- NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (7) 2003-03-03 2003-03-03 2005-05-07 2005-05-23 2005-05-23 2005-07-03 2007-05-19 Author is listed
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-26.
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