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A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy

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  • DE SINOPOLI, Francesco
  • TURRINI, Alessandro

Abstract

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen‐candidate model of representative democracy.
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  • DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 2002. "A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1562, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1562
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00093
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4(2), 163-170, 2002
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
    2. Anesi, Vincent, 2010. "Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.
    4. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    5. Emanuel Hansen, 2021. "Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists," CESifo Working Paper Series 9374, CESifo.

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