Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy

Contents:

Author Info

  • De Sinopoli, Francesco

Abstract

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-493P7MB-4/2/3b23d44b94018e0019a1eb9d793bccb6
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 41-54

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:41-54

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Govindan Srihari, 1995. "Stability and the Chain Store Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 536-547, August.
  3. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  4. Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February.
  5. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  6. MERTENS, Jean-François, . "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154422, Tilburg University.
  9. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84.
  10. Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  11. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  13. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
  16. repec:fth:louvco:9927 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:41-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.