Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy
AbstractThe Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999). Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004.
"A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
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- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003. "A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS 21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2008.
"Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections,"
Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy
WP52, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
- R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3900, CESifo Group Munich.
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