Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
AbstractWeak undominance is a standard refinement in the voting literature. This work characterizes the set of weakly undominated voting strategies in scoring rule elections. Scoring rules are voting procedures under which voters cast scores for the different alternatives or candidates. The scoring rules include many of the most widely used and studied voting procedures, such as Plurality Voting, the Borda Count and Approval Voting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 59 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Weak undominance Equilibrium refinement Strategic voting Scoring rule Elections;
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