Inferring Strategic Voting
AbstractWe estimate a model of strategic voting by adopting a recently developed inequality-based estimator in a discrete-choice framework. The difficulty of identification comes from the fact that preference and voting behavior do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence for strategic voters. We obtain partial identification of preference parameters from the restriction that voting for the least-preferred candidate is a weakly dominated strategy. The extent of strategic voting is identified using variation generated by multiple equilibria. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (68.2%, 82.7%) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (2.2%, 7.4%) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 803.
Date of creation: 2009
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