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A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law

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  • Fujiwara, Thomas
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    Abstract

    This paper uses exogenous variation in electoral rules to test the predictions of strategic voting models and the causal validity of Duverger's Law. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of single-ballot and dual-ballot (runoff) plurality systems in Brazilian mayoral races, the results indicate that single-ballot plurality rule causes voters to desert third placed candidates and vote for the top two vote getters. The effects are stronger in close elections and cannot be explained by differences in the number of candidates, as well as their party affiliation and observable characteristics.

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010037
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by now publishers in its journal International Quarterly Journal of Political Science.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 3–4 (November)
    Pages: 197-233

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    Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00010037

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    Web page: http://www.nowpublishers.com/

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    Cited by:
    1. Yasutora Watanabe & Kei Kawai, 2009. "Inferring Strategic Voting," 2009 Meeting Papers 803, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Guglielmo Barone & Guido de Blasio, 2011. "Electoral rules and voter turnout," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 833, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Achyuta Adhvaryu & James Fenske, 2014. "Conflict and the Formation of Political Beliefs in Africa," HiCN Working Papers 164, Households in Conflict Network.
    4. Brollo, Fernanda & Troiano, Ugo, 2013. "What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 161, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    5. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
    7. Janne Tukiainen & Teemu Lyytikäinen, 2013. "Voters are rational," Working Papers 50, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
    8. Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-88, June.
    9. Jean Guillaume Forand & Vikram Maheshri, 2013. "A Dynamic Duverger's Law," Working Papers 2013-295-05, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
    10. Garmann, Sebastian, 2013. "Elected or Appointed? How the Nomination Scheme of the City Manager Influences the Effects of Government Fragmentation," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79892, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Tuukka Saarimaa & Janne Tukiainen, 2013. "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary reforms," Working Papers 2013/32, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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