1. De Sinopoli, F. & Turrini, A., 1999. "A Remark on Voters' Rationality in Besley and Coate Model of Representative Democracy," Papers 9927, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
2. Mariotti, Marco, 2000. "Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 97-105, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Forsythe, Robert, et al, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 355-83.
4. Levin, Jonathan & Nalebuff, Barry, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998. "Voting Procedures," Working Papers 98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
   • Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
    Other versions:
    • Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, . "Robust Political Equilibria in Plurality and Runoff Voting Games," Working Papers 288, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
2. Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," IMF Working Papers 02/48, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2003. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns," IMF Working Papers 03/57, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
4. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case," Economics Working Papers we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
   • De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
5. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001. [Downloadable!]
6. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule," Discussion Papers 2006-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
7. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. le Borgne, E. & Lockwood, B., 2000. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 580, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]