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When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

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Dhillon, Amrita
Lockwood, Ben

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 55-75
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:55-75

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. De Sinopoli, F. & Turrini, A., 1999. "A Remark on Voters' Rationality in Besley and Coate Model of Representative Democracy," Papers 9927, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
  2. Mariotti, Marco, 2000. "Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 97-105, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Forsythe, Robert, et al, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 355-83.
  4. Levin, Jonathan & Nalebuff, Barry, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  1. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, . "Robust Political Equilibria in Plurality and Runoff Voting Games," Working Papers 288, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," IMF Working Papers 02/48, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2003. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns," IMF Working Papers 03/57, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001. [Downloadable!]
  6. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule," Discussion Papers 2006-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  7. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. le Borgne, E. & Lockwood, B., 2000. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 580, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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