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When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dhillon, Amrita
Lockwood, Ben
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 55-75
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:55-75Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998.
"Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999.
"A remark on votersÕ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy ,"
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Mariotti, Marco, 2000.
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Games and Economic Behavior ,
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Forsythe, Robert, et al, 1996.
"An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
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Levin, Jonathan & Nalebuff, Barry, 1995.
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Myerson, Roger B., 2002.
"Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
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Other versions: Rajan, Uday, 1998.
"Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September.
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Borgers, Tilman, 1992.
"Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model ,"
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Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria ,"
Econometrica ,
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Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988.
"A Theory of Voting Equilibria ,"
Discussion Papers
782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
Other versions:
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2002.
"Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle ,"
IMF Working Papers
02/48, International Monetary Fund.
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Other versions: Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2003.
"Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns ,"
IMF Working Papers
03/57, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000.
"Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria ,"
Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim
191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
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Daniel Seidmann, 2006.
"Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule ,"
Discussion Papers
2006-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999.
"A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003.
"A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy ,"
CEIS Research Paper
21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
[Downloadable!] De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004.
"A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) le Borgne, E. & Lockwood, B., 2000.
"Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
580, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008.
"Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"Extreme Voting Under Proportional Representation:The Multidimensional Case ,"
Economics Working Papers
we053421, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!] De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005.
"Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case ,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
[Downloadable!] M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007.
"The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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