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A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy

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Author Info
Francesco De Sinopoli () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)

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Abstract

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality. Some results on stable sets are then obtained.

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Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 21.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: 06 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:21

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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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Related research
Keywords: Voting games; refinements of Nash equilibrium; citizen-candidate; forward induction; Mertens' stable sets;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on votersÕ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  2. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  13. Govindan Srihari, 1995. "Stability and the Chain Store Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 536-547, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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