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Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games

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Abstract

This note investigates the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following results emerge from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria, and of strategically stable sets of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game with farsighted voters.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_551.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 551.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
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Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:551

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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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Keywords: Legislative bargaining; committee; strategic stability; stable set.;

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  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  4. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.
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  11. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
  12. Vincent Anesi, 2006. "Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
  13. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
  14. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  15. Hillas, John, 1990. "On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1365-90, November.
  16. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  17. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1466, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Anesi, Vincent & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  2. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee, 2013. "Dynamic Coalitions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 2128, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2012. "Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 2121, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.
  5. Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2012. "Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 349-353.
  7. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 333, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  8. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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