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Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

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  • Anesi, Vincent

Abstract

This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 70 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 488-493

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:488-493

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Legislative bargaining Committee Stationary Markov equilibrium Stable set;

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References

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  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999. "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers 1999027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey, 2012. "The dynamics of distributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 739-777, April.
  3. Duggan, John & Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2012. "Dynamic legislative policy making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1653-1688.
  4. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
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  6. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," 2005 Meeting Papers 209, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2011. "A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 611-650, April.
  9. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003. "A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy," CEIS Research Paper 21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  11. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," Discussion Papers 1466, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
  14. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  15. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
  16. Vincent Anesi, 2006. "Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
  17. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  18. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  19. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Vincent Anesi, 2012. "A new old solution for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
  3. T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2012. "Mandatory Versus Discretionary Spending: the Status Quo Effect," Economics Working Paper Archive 603, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  4. Anesi, Vincent & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  5. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 333, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  6. Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2012. "Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 349-353.
  7. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.
  8. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee, 2013. "Dynamic Coalitions," Research Papers 2128, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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