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Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets

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  • Vincent Anesi

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  • Vincent Anesi, 2006. "Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:595-610
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Linda Cohen & Steven Matthews, 1980. "Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(5), pages 975-986.
    2. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
    3. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937.
    4. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    5. Carlo Carraro (ed.), 2003. "The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2999.
    6. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
    7. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1999. "Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 216-226, February.
    8. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
    10. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
    11. Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May.
    12. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-187.
    13. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 111-127.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Anesi, 2012. "A new old solution for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
    2. Vincent Anesi, 2012. "A new old solution for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
    3. Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014. "Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
    4. , & , J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    5. Anesi, Vincent, 2010. "Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
    6. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2022. "Deciding On What To Decide," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 37-61, February.
    7. Daniel Diermeier & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2017. "Political Economy of Redistribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 851-870, May.
    8. Vicki Knoblauch, 2020. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 369-381, October.
    9. Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2015. "Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 309-327, September.
    11. Duggan, John, 2017. "Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 111-126.
    12. Anesi, Vincent & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.

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