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Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets

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Author Info
Vincent Anesi ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 595-610
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:595-610

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  2. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1999. "Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 216-226, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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