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On the emptiness of the stability set of order d

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  • M. Martin

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  • M. Martin, 2001. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," THEMA Working Papers 2001-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2001-04
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    1. Adrian Van Deemen, 1999. "The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    3. Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
    4. Ferejohn, John A. & Grether, David M., 1974. "On a class of rational social decision procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 471-482, August.
    5. Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May.
    6. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1980. "The paradox of voting : Effects of individual indifference and intransitivity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 83-94, August.
    7. Thomas Hansen & Barry Prince, 1973. "The paradox of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 103-117, June.
    8. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
    10. Duncan J. Melville & Deanna B. Haunsperger, 1996. "Voting power when using preference ballots," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 457-465.
    11. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    12. William Gehrlein & Fabrice Valognes, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Post-Print halshs-02173169, HAL.
    13. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 111-127.
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