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The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes

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  • Merlin, Vincent
  • Valognes, Fabrice

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 343-361

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:343-361

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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References

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  1. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles," Papers 223, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
  2. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
  3. B. Dutta & J-F. Laslier, 1998. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Lepelley, Dominique & Martin, Mathieu, 2001. "Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 163-177, March.
  5. Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
  6. Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
  7. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
  8. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
  9. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  10. Adrian Van Deemen, 1999. "The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182.
  11. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
  12. Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 217-231.
  13. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
  14. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1980. "The paradox of voting : Effects of individual indifference and intransitivity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 83-94, August.
  15. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Post-Print halshs-00443854, HAL.
  2. Michael Ackerman & Sul-Young Choi & Peter Coughlin & Eric Gottlieb & Japheth Wood, 2013. "Elections with partially ordered preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 145-168, October.
  3. Katharina Holzinger & Andrea Schneider & Klaus Zimmermann, 2011. "Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 303-324, December.
  4. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.

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