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Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox

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  • Gilbert Laffond
  • Jean Lainé

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  • Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:2:p:317-333
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0325-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
    2. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    3. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
    4. Marco Scarsini, 1998. "A strong paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 237-238.
    5. Laffond G. & Laslier, J. F. & Le Breton, M., 1996. "Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 59-59, February.
    6. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
    7. Deb, Rajat & Kelsey, David, 1987. "On constructing a generalized ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 161-174, October.
    8. Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 217-231.
    9. Begoña Subiza & Josep Peris, 2005. "Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(3), pages 497-508, June.
    10. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    11. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    12. Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-Francois Laslier, 1999. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 513-532.
    13. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July.
    14. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier, 1996. "Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 75-93, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
    2. Jean Lainé & Ali Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Hyper-stable social welfare functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 157-182, January.
    3. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2014. "Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 784-799, July.
    4. Meir Kalech & Moshe Koppel & Abraham Diskin & Eli Rohn & Inbal Roshanski, 2020. "Formation of Parties and Coalitions in Multiple Referendums," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 723-745, August.
    5. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
    6. Andreas Darmann, 2016. "It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 84(1), pages 93-104, August.
    7. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.
    8. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.

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