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Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments

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Author Info
Josep E. Peris () (Departamento de Fundamentos del AnÂlisis EconÕmico, Universidad de Alicante, E-03080 Alicante, Spain)
BegoÓa Subiza () (Departamento de Fundamentos del AnÂlisis EconÕmico, Universidad de Alicante, E-03080 Alicante, Spain)

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Abstract

Tournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are quite common in other contexts. In this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournament solutions to the context in which ties are possible.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 217-231
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:217-231

Note: Received: 12 November 1996/Accepted: 4 November 1997
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  1. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza, 1999. "- Choice Functions: Rationality Re-Examined," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza, 2003. "Condorcet Choice Functions And Maximal Elements," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-40, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. LASLIER, Jean-Franois & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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