Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements
AbstractChoice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in weak tournaments. We introduce choice functions selecting maximal elements, whenever they exist. Moreover, we compare these choice functions with those that already exist in the literature.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
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- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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