Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?
AbstractWithin the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2000022.
Date of creation: 00 Mar 2000
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