Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
AbstractTournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are common in different contexts. In this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournaments solutions (top cycle, uncovered set and minimal covering) to the context where ties are possible.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1997-05.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Tournament; uncovered set; minimal covering;
Other versions of this item:
- Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 217-231.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza, 1999.
"- Choice Functions: Rationality Re-Examined,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1999-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
- John Duggan, 2011. "Uncovered Sets," Wallis Working Papers WP63, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza Martínez, 2003.
"Condorcet Choice Functions And Maximal Elements,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-40, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Banks, Jeffrey & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2003.
"Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model,"
IDEI Working Papers
188, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2006. "Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 194-234, January.
- Monsuur, Herman, 2005. "Characterizations of the 3-cycle count and backward length of a tournament," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(3), pages 778-784, August.
- Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
- Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence," Working Papers 201005, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
- Brandt, Felix & Fischer, Felix, 2008. "Computing the minimal covering set," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 254-268, September.
- LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
- Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.