Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments

Contents:

Author Info

  • Josep Enric Peris Ferrando

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Begoña Subiza Martínez

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

Tournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are common in different contexts. In this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournaments solutions (top cycle, uncovered set and minimal covering) to the context where ties are possible.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1997-05.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1997
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1997-05.

as in new window
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-05

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Tournament; uncovered set; minimal covering;

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2006. "Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 194-234, January.
  2. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza, 1999. "- Choice Functions: Rationality Re-Examined," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1999-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Monsuur, Herman, 2005. "Characterizations of the 3-cycle count and backward length of a tournament," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(3), pages 778-784, August.
  4. John Duggan, 2013. "Uncovered sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 489-535, September.
  5. Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence," Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University 201005, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
  6. Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  7. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
  8. John Duggan, 2011. "Uncovered Sets," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP63, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  9. Begoña Subiza & Josep Peris, 2005. "Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-508, 06.
  10. Marc Pauly, 2014. "Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 29-46, June.
  11. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
  12. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.
  13. Brandt, Felix & Fischer, Felix, 2008. "Computing the minimal covering set," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 254-268, September.
  14. LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.