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Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence

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  • Ceyhun Coban

    (Department of Economics,Washington University in St. Louis)

  • Remzi Sanver

    (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University)

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    Abstract

    We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identiÖed by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.

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    File URL: http://repeck.bilgi.edu.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscenter_2010_05-Coban__Sanver_-_Social_Choice_without_the_Pareto_Principle_under_Weak_Independence.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University in its series Working Papers with number 201005.

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    Length: 10 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:msc:wpaper:201005

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    Web page: http://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr
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    1. Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 217-231.
    2. Campbell, Donald E., 1976. "Democratic preference functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 259-272, April.
    3. I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
    4. Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
    5. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    6. Blau, Julian H, 1971. "Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 413-20, November.
    7. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
    8. Vincenzo DenicolÔ, 1998. "Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 563-566.
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