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Information about:
Remzi Sanver

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by Remzi Sanver in registering through RePEc. If you are Remzi Sanver , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Other registered authors


Personal Details

First Name: Remzi
Middle Name:
Last Name: Sanver
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: psa232

Email:
Homepage:
http://sanver.bilgi.edu.tr
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Works

|
Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Brams, S.J. & Sanver, R.M., 2003. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Working Papers 03-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

  2. Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Departmental Working Papers 0107, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
    Published as:


Articles

  1. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2008. "Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 298-300, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  3. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  4. Benoit, Jean Pierre & Ok, Efe A. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "On combining implementable social choice rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 20-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  5. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2007. "Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 439-442, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  7. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  8. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 257-260, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  9. Dogan, Emre & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "On the alternating use of "unanimity" and "surjectivity" in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 140-143, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  10. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  11. Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  12. M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 453-460, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  13. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  14. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  15. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  16. M. Sanver, 2005. "Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 307-316, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  17. Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  18. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  19. Barış Kaymak & M. Remzi Sanver, 2003. "Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 477-494, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  20. Sanver, M Remzi, 2002. " An Allocation Rule with Wealth-Regressive Tax Rates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 63-69. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  21. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  22. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 151-155, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  23. Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 1999. "Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-162, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)


NEP Fields

1 paper by this author was announced in
NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2003-12-07 Author is listed
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2003-12-07 Author is listed

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-5.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.