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Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

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Author Info
Selçuk Özyurt
M. Sanver ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-101
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:1:p:89-101

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  1. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Aswal, N. & Chatterji, S. & Sen, A,, 1999. "Dictatorial Domains," Papers 9940, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
  3. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Feldman, Allan, 1979. "Manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 473-482, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kannai, Yakar & Peleg, Bezalel, 1984. "A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 172-175, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-31.


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