Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
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- Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001.
"Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners,"
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- Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, 04.
- Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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