From equilibrium models to mechanism design : On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century
Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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