From equilibrium models to mechanism design : On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century
AbstractFocussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 09008.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
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General equilibrium; Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell public competitive equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; mechanism design; free-rider problem; incentive compatibility.;
Other versions of this item:
- B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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