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Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism

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  • Tian, Guoqiang

Abstract

This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 169-179

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:169-179

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
  3. Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1991. "Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-79, February.
  4. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
  5. Kim, Taesung & Richter, Marcel K., 1986. "Nontransitive-nontotal consumer theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 324-363, April.
  6. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
  7. Tian, Guoqiang, 1989. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 613-21, October.
  8. Tian, Guoqiang, 1988. "On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 299-303.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  2. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  3. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.
  4. Sébastien Rouillon, 2013. "Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 1179-1203, April.
  5. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Tian, Guoqiang, 1997. "Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-339, October.
  7. Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1995. "Ratio-Lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 391-411, May.
  8. Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 175-189, September.
  9. Guoqiang Tian, 1999. "Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 99-119.

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