Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
AbstractThis paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Other versions of this item:
- Tian, Guoqiang, 1991. "Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism," MPRA Paper 41255, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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