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Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice

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  • İpek Özkal-Sanver

    (İstanbul Bilgi University)

  • M. Remzi Sanver

    (İstanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract

We introduce a social choice axiom called efficiency in the degree of compromise. Our axiom is based on the trade-off between the quantity and quality of support that an alternative receives. What we mean by the quantity of support is the number of voters behind an alternative, while the quality of support is about the definition of “being behind” depending on the rank of an alternative in voters' preference orderings. Naturally, one can increase the quantity of support of an alternative to the expense of giving up from its quality. We say that an alternative is an efficient compromise if there exists no other alternative with at least an equal quantity of support with a higher quality. Our efficient compromise axiom is based on not choosing inefficient compromises. We introduce it and show that many standard social choice rules of the literature, such as Condorcet-consistent rules, plurality with a runoff, the Borda count and the single transferable vote, may choose inefficient compromises.

Suggested Citation

  • İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 375-380, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:13:y:2004:i:4:d:10.1023_b:grup.0000042925.01972.ad
    DOI: 10.1023/B:GRUP.0000042925.01972.ad
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
    2. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2023. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 547-560, September.
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Working Papers hal-03614585, HAL.
    3. Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, February.
    4. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
    5. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8068 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8668 is not listed on IDEAS

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