On combining implementable social choice rules
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Social Choice and Welfare,
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- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 331-339, May.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002.
"Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set,"
Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(2), pages 285-298, May.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
- Kutlu, Levent, 2008. "Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 255-257, March.
- Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
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