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Choosers as extension axioms

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  • Bora Erdamar
  • M. Sanver

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-008-9113-3
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

    Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 375-384

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:4:p:375-384

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

    Related research

    Keywords: Preferences over sets; Non-resolute outcomes;

    References

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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. John Duggan & Thomas Schwartz, 2000. "Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 85-93.
    3. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2002. "Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 421-436, February.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1996. "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 90-101, October.
    5. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
    6. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
    7. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
    8. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    9. Kannai, Yakar & Peleg, Bezalel, 1984. "A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 172-175, February.
    10. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    11. Sertel, Murat R & Van der Bellen, Alexander, 1979. "Synopses in the Theory of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1367-89, November.
    12. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2010. "On the rule of k names," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 44-61, September.
    13. Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L & Rustichini, Aldo, 2001. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 891-934, July.
    14. Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2002. "A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 809-829.
    15. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
    16. Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
    17. Barış Kaymak & M. Remzi Sanver, 2003. "Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 477-494, 06.
    18. Kreps, David M, 1979. "A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 565-77, May.
    19. Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April.
    20. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January.
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    Cited by:
    1. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    2. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.

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