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Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences

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Author Info
Barbera, Salvador
Dutta, Bhaskar
Sen, Arunava

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 101 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 374-394
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:374-394

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2007. "Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition," Working Papers 51, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  3. José Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez & Estefanía García, 2009. "An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 343-359, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2007. "On the manipulation of social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 175-199, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shin Sato, 2008. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 331-343, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Peleg,Bezalel & Peters,Hans, 2005. "Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models," Research Memoranda 030, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  10. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  12. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Masashi Umezawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 151-158, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Working Papers 0113, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Marco Mariotti, 2003. "Even Allocations For Generalised Rationing Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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