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Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

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Author Info
Lin Zhou () (Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG)
Stephen Ching () (Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG)

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 569-580
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:569-580

Note: Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001
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  1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2001. "Generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness for non-resolute social choice correspondences," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4, pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  2. Shin Sato, 2008. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 331-343, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  6. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2007. "Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition," Working Papers 51, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  7. Masashi Umezawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 151-158, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. José Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez & Estefanía García, 2009. "An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 343-359, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. William Thomson, 2009. "Borrowing-proofness," RCER Working Papers 545, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
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