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Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

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  • John Duggan
  • Thomas Schwartz

Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 85-93

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:1:p:85-93

Note: Received: 15 December 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998
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Cited by:
  1. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2011. "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 431-446, December.
  2. Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 621-632, October.
  3. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2009. "Tops-Only Domains," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22064, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  5. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2001. "Generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness for non-resolute social choice correspondences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-8.
  6. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  7. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  8. Weber, Tjark, 2009. "Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," MPRA Paper 17836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
  10. Alexander Reffgen, 2011. "Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 39-59, June.
  11. Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Choosers as extension axioms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 375-384, October.

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