Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fuad Aleskerov

    ()

  • Daniel Karabekyan

    ()

  • M. Sanver

    ()

  • Vyacheslav Yakuba

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 431-446

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:431-446

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Universidad del País Vasco; DFAE II; Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83; 48015 Bilbao; Spain
Phone: +34 94 6013783
Fax: + 34 94 6013774
Email:
Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13209
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Manipulability; Positional voting rules; Multiple choice; Extended preferences; D7;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Fuad Aleskerov & Vyacheslav Chistyakov & Valery Kalyagin, 2010. "Social threshold aggregations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 627-646, October.
  2. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
  4. Aleskerov, Fuad & Chistyakov, Vyacheslav V. & Kalyagin, Valery, 2010. "The threshold aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 261-262, May.
  5. Geoffrey Pritchard & Mark Wilson, 2007. "Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 487-513, October.
  6. Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
  7. David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661.
  8. John Duggan & Thomas Schwartz, 2000. "Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 85-93.
  9. Barbera, Salvador, 1977. "The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1573-88, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:431-446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.