Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
AbstractThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17836.
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-10-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2009-10-17 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-10-17 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-10-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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