Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 70 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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- Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April.
- Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June.
- repec:fth:louvco:9940 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2006. "Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 81-89, January.
- Alexander Reffgen, 2011. "Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 39-59, June.
- Anup Pramanik, 2014. "Further Results on Dictatorial Domains," ISER Discussion Paper 0899, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Miljkovic, Dragan, 2009. "International organizations and arrangements: Pivotal countries and manipulations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1398-1402, November.
- Ville Korpela, 2012. "A Differential Approach to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Discussion Papers 74, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2012.
"A Unifying Impossibility Theorem,"
Discussion Papers Series
448, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Anup Pramanik & Arunava Sen, 2014. "Pairwise Partition Graphs and Strategy-proof Social Choice in the Exogenous Indifference Class Model," ISER Discussion Paper 0898, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Salvador Barberà, 2003.
"A Theorem on Preference Aggregation,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
601.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Miller, Michael K., 2009. "Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 251-255, September.
- Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar, 2012. "Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 418-421.
- Cato, Susumu, 2009. "Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 239-241, December.
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