This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Arrow’S Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity In A Single-Profile World

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roberto Serrano ()
Allan M. Feldman () (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/07/0710.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CEMFI in its series Working Papers with number wp2007_0710.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2007_0710

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Casado del Alisal, 5, 28014 Madrid
Phone: 914290551
Fax: 914291056
Email:
Web page: http://www.cemfi.es/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Irene Telo).

Related research
Keywords: Arrow's theorem; single-profile; preference diversity.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2005. "The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 381-418, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pollak, Robert A, 1979. "Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 73-90, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kemp, Murray C & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1976. "On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(169), pages 59-66, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2006-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Roberts, Kevin W S, 1980. "Social Choice Theory: The Single-profile and Multi-profile Approaches," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2), pages 441-50, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Parks, Robert P, 1976. "An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(3), pages 447-50, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.