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Arrow’S Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity In A Single-Profile World

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  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

  • Allan M. Feldman

    ()
    (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)

Abstract

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEMFI in its series Working Papers with number wp2007_0710.

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Date of creation: Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2007_0710

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Keywords: Arrow's theorem; single-profile; preference diversity.;

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References

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  1. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2008. "A characterization of consistent collective choice rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 311-320, January.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2004. "The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated," Working Papers hal-00242931, HAL.
  3. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  4. Pollak, Robert A, 1979. "Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 73-90, February.
  5. Roberts, Kevin W S, 1980. "Social Choice Theory: The Single-profile and Multi-profile Approaches," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 441-50, January.
  6. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-79, May.
  7. Parks, Robert P, 1976. "An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 447-50, October.
  8. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
  9. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
  10. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
  11. Kemp, Murray C & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1976. "On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(169), pages 59-66, February.
  12. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Roberto Serrano, 2009. "On Watson'S Non-Forcing Contracts And Renegotiation," Working Papers wp2009_0907, CEMFI.
  2. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Preference of Social Choice in Mathematical Economics," Indus Journal of Management & Social Science (IJMSS), Department of Business Administration, vol. 3(1), pages 18-38, June.
  3. Rafael Repullo & David Martínez-Miera, 2008. "Does Competition Reduce The Risk Of Bank Failure?," Working Papers wp2008_0801, CEMFI.
  4. Manuel Arellano & Lars Peter Hansen & Enrique Sentana, 2009. "Underidentification?," Working Papers wp2009_0905, CEMFI.
  5. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers 2009-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Roberto Serrano & Yusuke Kamishiro, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking In Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers wp2009_0911, CEMFI.
  7. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2008. "The Procyclical Effects Of Basel Ii," Working Papers wp2008_0809, CEMFI.
  8. Max Bruche, 2009. "Bankruptcy Codes, Liquidation Timing, And Debt Valuation," Working Papers wp2009_0902, CEMFI.
  9. Joan Llull, 2008. "The Impact Of Immigration On Productivity," Working Papers wp2008_0802, CEMFI.

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