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Lecture Notes on Voting Theory

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  • Davide Grossi

Abstract

These lecture notes have been developed for the course Computational Social Choice of the Artificial Intelligence MSc programme at the University of Groningen. They cover mathematical and algorithmic aspects of voting theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2105.00216
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.00216
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    References listed on IDEAS

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