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Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters

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Fishburn, Peter C.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 2 (1970)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 103-106
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:2:y:1970:i:1:p:103-106

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  1. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," MPRA Paper 8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2009. "On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eisermann, Michael, 2006. "Arrovian juntas," MPRA Paper 81, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  4. Herzberg, Frederik S., 2008. "Judgement aggregation functions and ultraproducts," MPRA Paper 10546, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "Sustainable preferences via nondiscounted, hyperreal intergenerational welfare functions," MPRA Paper 7461, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pierre Batteau, 1978. "Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters and Simple Games," Discussion Papers 318, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ricard Torres, 2002. "Smallness of Invisible Dictators," Working Papers 0213, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
  8. Elisha A. Pazner & Eugene Wesley, 1974. "A Limit Theorem on the Cheatproofness of the Plurality Rule," Discussion Papers 126, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Andrei Gomberg & Cesar Martinelli & Ricard Torres, 2002. "Anonymity in Large Societies," Working Papers 0211, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
  11. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 07 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
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  12. H. Reiju Mihara, 1994. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics 9408001, EconWPA, revised 23 Aug 1994. [Downloadable!]
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