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La democratie: oui, mais laquelle?

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  • Truchon, M.

Abstract

Cet article illustre les difficultes inherentes au processus democratique a partir des resultats d'une consultation tenue a l'Universite Laval, dans le cadre de la nomination d'un doyen.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique in its series Papers with number 9610.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavape:9610

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.
Phone: (418) 656-5122
Fax: (418) 656-2707
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Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/
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Keywords: ECONOMIE POLITIQUE; DEMOCRATIE; POLITIQUE;

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References

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  1. Donald G. Saari, 1985. "The Optimal Ranking Method is the Borda Count," Discussion Papers 638, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter.
  3. Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1995. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 95.01, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
  4. Simpson, Paul B, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 478-90, August.
  5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  6. Kenneth J. Arrow & Herve Raynaud, 1986. "Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511754, December.
  7. Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
  8. Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996. "A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions," Papers 9602, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  9. Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1993. "Acyclicity and the Dispersion of the Veto Power," Papers 9317, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  10. Truchon, Michel, 1998. "An Extension of the Concordet Criterion and Kemeny Orders," Cahiers de recherche 9813, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  11. Truchon, Michel, 1995. "Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 165-179, April.
  12. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
  13. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
  14. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
  15. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  16. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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