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A Borda measure for social choice functions

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Truchon, Michel

Abstract

The question addressed in this paper is the order of magnitude of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function. In this paper, a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function is proposed. It is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by the social choice function under scrutiny over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, it is the minimum of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences that is used. This "Borda measure" or at least bounds for this measure is also computed for well known social choice functions.
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  • Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997. "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 249-272, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:34:y:1997:i:3:p:249-272
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    Cited by:

    1. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 2000. "Choosing from a weighted tournament1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 85-109, July.
    2. Truchon, Michel, 1999. "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 189-214, mars-juin.
    3. Saari, Donald G., 1999. "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 313-355, August.
    4. Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
    5. Truchon, Michel, 1998. "Figure Skating and the Theory of Social Choice," Cahiers de recherche 9814, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    6. Tien-Yu Lin, 2023. "A Hybrid Quantified SWOT Analysis to Label the Competitive Positioning for Theme Parks: A Case Study of Taiwan," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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