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A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences

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  • De Donder, P.
  • Le Breton, M.
  • Truchon, M.

Abstract

Given the choice sets produced by a pair of Condorcet social choice correspondence, the following intersting questions arise. Does one of these sets always contain the other? If not, do they always interest or on the contrary can they have an empty intersection? Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1995) answer these questions for Condorcet social choice correspondences based exclusively on the simple majority relation, callaed C1 choice correspondences by Fishburn (1977). In the present paper, we conduct the same task for five Condorcet correspondences that require the size of the majorities to operate.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 180.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:180

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Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM;

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Cited by:
  1. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 1998. " The Political Economy of Targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 177-200, April.

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